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Abstract Findings in the field of experimental psychology
and cognitive neuroscience have shed new light on our
understanding of the psychological and biological bases
of morality. Although a lot of attention has been devoted
to understanding the processes that underlie complex mor-
al dilemmas, attempts to represent the way in which indi-
viduals generate moral judgments when processing basic
harmful actions are rare. Here, we will outline a model of
morality which proposes that the evaluation of basic harm-
ful actions relies on complex interactions between emo-
tional arousal, Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities, and in-
hibitory control resources. This model makes clear predic-
tions regarding the cognitive processes underlying the de-
velopment of and ability to generate moral judgments. We
draw on data from developmental and cognitive psychol-
ogy, cognitive neuroscience, and psychopathology research
to evaluate the model and propose several conceptual and
methodological improvements that are needed to further
advance our understanding of moral cognition and its
development.
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Introduction
Recent findings in the fields of cognitive psychology and
cognitive neuroscience support the notion that morality is
made up of multiple complex processes and implicate a
widely distributed network of brain areas (Moll, Zahn,
de Oliveira-souza, Krueger, & Grafman, 2005; Young &
Dungan, 2011). Importantly, it is now clear that processes
such as empathy (Reniers et al., 2012), Theory of Mind
(ToM) (Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 2007), executive
control (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen,
2008; Moore, Clark, & Kane, 2008) and abstract reasoning
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004) are typi-
cally deployed when computing moral judgments and moral
decisions.
Building upon this recent evidence, several authors have
theorized that morality is supported by distinct evaluative sys-
tems that can act in concert, in competition, or in conflict, each
resting upon specific cognitive processes, and help individuals
decide what is right and what is wrong (Cushman, Young, &
Greene, 2007; Cushman, 2008; Greene, 2009). For instance,
Greene’s dual process of morality (Greene, 2009) describes
the computations engaged in the processing of the now
famous Trolley dilemmas. In these type of dilemmas, a trolley
is running out of control on a track and is about to kill five
people. Individuals have to decide whether or not they would
kill a man to save five people either by pulling a lever that will
switch the trolley to a track where only one man is standing
(Fig. 1a), or by pushing a man off a footbridge and into the
path of the trolley in order to stop it (Fig. 1b). Typically,
whereas individuals tend to say they would pull the lever to
save five people (and thus give a utilitarian judgment, i.e., a
judgment that focuses on the consequence of the action), most
say they would not push the man to save the same number of
people (and thus make a deontogical judgment, i.e., a
* Marine Buon
marinebuon@gmail.com
1 Division of Psychology and Language Sciences, University College
London, London, UK
2 Neuropsychopysiology Lab, CIPsi, University of Minho,
Braga, Portugal
3 Institute of Cognitive Neuroscience, University College London,
London, UK
Psychon Bull Rev
DOI 10.3758/s13423-016-1042-5
judgment that focuses on the wrongness of the action itself).
According to Greene’s model, generating an utilitarian judg-
ment when faced with pushing someone off the footbridge is
difficult because individuals undergo a strong cognitive con-
flict: on one side, a system responsible for the evaluation of
the action to be performed generates an automatic emotional
aversion that leads them to condemn the action; and on anoth-
er side, a system responsible for the rational evaluation of the
utilitarian consequences of the action (i.e., the ratio lives
saved/deaths) leads them to consider this action as permissi-
ble. Critically, in order for this conflict to be solved in favor of
the Brational^ evaluation, people need to deploy inhibitory
control to override the initial strong negative emotional aver-
sion to pushing someone off the bridge. While there is strong
evidence supporting this theoretical proposition (for review,
see Cushman, Young&Greene, 2010), the explanatory power
of this model remains restricted to judgment of highly com-
plex and highly specific moral situations (situations in which
deontological and utilitarian judgments are in conflict). This
prevents the generalization of such an architecture of moral cog-
nition to othermoral situationswhere theremay also be a conflict
between emotion processing and other aspects of cognition, but
which do not require an utilitarian computation. Furthermore,
even thought the type of architecture proposed by Greene
(2009) may have an important impact in the study of the devel-
opment of moral competencies (Buon, Habib & Frey, 2015),
trolley-likemoral dilemmas are especially complex, which limits
the investigation of this model in young populations using such
dilemmas (but see Pellizzoni, Siegal & Surian, 2010).
Cushman’s (2008) dual-process model of morality also spec-
ifies an interplay between two different evaluative systems, one
involving the evaluation of the agent’s causal responsibility (i.e.,
whether the agent caused harm), the other involving the evalua-
tion of the agent’s mental state (i.e., whether the agent intended
to cause harm), as critical for making moral judgments. The
basic situations of harm that have been described to test the
hypotheses set out by this model are present in our everyday life
and different from the complex trolley and footbridge dilemmas.
However, they still typically involve a set of different computa-
tions and likely require a complex interplay between the evalu-
ative systems for causal responsibility and agent’s mental state,
which can act either in concert, in conflict, or in competition.
While Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, and Carey (2013) agrees
that ToM competencies and executive control are probably use-
ful in helping individuals integrate information about intention to
their moral judgment, he does not provide a precise description
of theway inwhich different processesmay interact in adulthood
and during the development to allow individuals to judge typical
situations of harm. In addition, the potential affective nature of
the processes underlying causal and intentional evaluations is not
considered. Instead, Cushman’s dual-processes model focuses
on the privileged information that different types of moral judg-
ments (i.e., wrongness and punishment) may take as critical
inputs. More specifically, for Cushman, whereas wrongness
judgment tends to exclusively depend on information about
intentions, punishment judgment primarily relies on information
about causation, but is constrained by intent/wrongness
judgment.
In the present article, we aim to provide an account of the
cognitive-affective processes that underlie our ability to gen-
erate and integrate evaluations of an agent’s causal role and of
the agent’s intention to cause harm in our moral judgments.
More specifically, our goal is to characterize the way in which
individuals successfully generate and integrate information
about an agent’s causal responsibility, and his intention to
harm, in moral judgments of harmful actions. Let's imagine
a situation: If we see Mr Blue pushing Mr Red and injuring
him, we are likely to get an automatic emotional response as
we see Mr Red’s suffering (see Fig. 2a and b). This automatic
response may lead us to evaluate Mr Blue badly. But, as
Fig. 1 Schematic representation of Greene’s dual processes model of moral judgment. This figure describes the processes underlying individuals’
judgment about (a) the Trolley dilemma and (b) the Footbridge dillema
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adults, we are also likely to evaluate whether Mr Blue harmed
Mr Red intentionally or not. If, due to our ability to represent
mental states, we deduce that Mr Blue’s act was unintentional,
we will likely exculpate him for his harmful behavior
(Fig. 2b). We will thus inhibit the negative evaluation initially
triggered by the perception of harm that was caused.
Alternatively, if we think that Mr Blue’s act was intentional,
we will assign him the maximum blame (Fig. 2a).
In the following sections, we will first detail a workingmodel
of processes underlying the ability to generate moral judgments
Fig. 2 The ETIC (E=emotional arousal, T=theory of mind,
IC=inhibitory control) model of morality. Schematic representation of
the processes involved in moral judgment about agents who committed
intentional harm, accidental harm, and attempted harm. (a) An intentional
harm. Mr Blue is on a swing, sees Mr Red arriving and strikes him. His
intention is negative (to strike Mr. Red) and his causal role is negative too
(he strikes Mr. Red). (b) An accidental harm. Mr Blue is on a swing with
his back to Mr Red and hits him accidentally. His intention is neutral (to
swing) but his causal role is negative (he swings back and hits Mr Red).
(c) An attempted harm. Mr Blue is on a swing, sees Mr Red arriving and
tries to hit him. Mr Blue intention is negative (to hit Mr Red) but his
causal role is neutral (he fails to hit Mr Red)
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of harmful actions in which emotional arousal, ToM capacities,
and inhibitory control resources have a critical role (section The
ETIC model of morality). This model, that we will call the ETIC
(E=emotional arousal, T=theory of mind, IC=inhibitory control)
model of morality, will serve as a framework for critically
reviewing and discussing findings from cognitive psychology
and neuroscience (section Cognitive and neural architecture un-
derlying moral judgment about harmful situations: Insights from
adult samples), as well as from developmental psychology
(section Moral judgement in typically developing children) and
psychopathology (section Insights from clinical populations),
that have a bearing on the model. By doing so, we hope to
contribute to the quickly growing literature in several ways.
First, the ETIC model is the first attempt to bind and advance
Greene’s and Cushman’s important theoretical propositions into
a comprehensive account of the processes involved in our judg-
ments of basic harmful actions. The ETIC model assumes that
the core of morality is grounded in an emotional intuition trig-
gered by the perception of a harmful action, which is subsequent-
ly modulated or inhibited by higher evaluative systems, and is
therefore structurally similar to Greene’s proposition. Analyzing
its empirical validity is critical to understand whether our moral
competencies rely on a generic cognitive architecture which al-
lows us to judge different types of morally salient situations.
Second, by systematically investigating the precise computations
involved in processing basic harmful actions, our critical review
will shed light on several issues that need to be addressed if we
want to refine our understanding of the role of, and the interaction
between, emotional processes (section The role of affective pro-
cessing in integrating information about the agent’s causal role
and intention to harm into moral judgment), ToM (section The
role and nature of ToM mechanisms in moral judgments), and
inhibitory control (section Exploring the contribution of inhibi-
tory control resources) in both moral judgment and moral behav-
ior (6.3) from a life-long and multidisciplinary perceptive.
The ETIC model of morality
What computations are employed when we make a moral eval-
uation about Mr Blue’s behavior (Mr Blue pushes Mr Red,
Fig. 2)? We may employ a system responsible for the evalua-
tion of the causal properties of the agent's action, and a system
responsible for the evaluation of the agent’s intention
(Cushman, 2008). The first system would be composed of ba-
sic computations of the agent’s causal role, while the latter of
computations of the intentional state of the agent. In each case,
these computations would be followed by moral evaluations of
the agent’s causal role and intention to harm; each moral eval-
uation providing a separate valenced response from a moral
standpoint (causal-moral evaluation: he caused harm = he is
bad; intentional-moral evaluation: he wanted to cause harm =
he is bad). This dual-processes account of moral judgment
abilities has several implications. Notably, it proposes – in line
with Cushman’s model – that the two moral evaluations could
act in concert, in conflict, or by entering in competition. For
instance, in case of intentional harm (see Table 1, when
someone causes negative outcome with negative intention),
one could expect the two moral evaluative systems to generally
act in concert because of their congruent outputs. Accidental
harm (when someone causes negative outcome with neutral or
positive intention that), in contrast, should generally trigger a
cognitive conflict given the opposite outputs arising from the
causal-moral evaluation and the intentional-moral evaluation
(he caused harm = he is bad; but he did not want to cause harm
= he is not bad). Finally, in case of attempted harm (when
someone has negative intention but causes nothing), one should
expect the twomoral evaluative systems to act competitively. If
the agents’ action causes no harm at all, the causal-moral eval-
uation system would not be engaged and the intentional-moral
evaluation would dominate the moral judgment.
The consideration of the computations implicated in each
type of evaluation leads us to question the potential role of the
three cognitive processes in moral judgment: emotional arous-
al, ToM capacities, and inhibitory control resources.
Emotional arousal, operationalized here as the affective re-
sponse that is automatically triggered by the observation or
the representation of someone else’s distress (Eisenberg,
2000; Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, Mccrory, & Viding,
2012), is proposed to be critical for generating an automatic
and negative reaction to Mr Red (the victim)’s distress. ToM
capacities, defined as the ability to represent and use agents’
mental states to explain other people’s behaviors (Premack &
Woodruff, 1978), is proposed to be relevant for basic compu-
tations of the agent’s intention as well as to morally evaluating
them. Finally, inhibitory control resources, defined here as
those cognitive processes that enable regulation and control
of other cognitive processes (Chan, Shum, Toulopoulou, &
Chen., 2008), might be specifically useful for solving conflicts
if the outputs from the two evaluative systems are incongruent
(e.g., in case of accidental harm). We will illustrate further the
involvement of these processes by analysing each type of
harmful situation in turn.
In the case of intentional harm (Fig. 2a), we propose that
individuals will typically generate a moral judgment as fol-
lows: First, an automatic negative emotional reaction to Mr
Red’s suffering/distress is likely to occur through basic emo-
tional arousal triggered by the emotional contagion taking
place when one perceives someone else’s distress (see
Decety & Cowell, 2014). This reaction is likely to be linked
to Mr Blue’s through a basic computation of physical causal-
ity, i.e., who caused the harm (basic causal computation). The
automatic negative response would thus be the critical input
for the causal-moral evaluation of the agent (he caused harm =
he is bad). In parallel, the computation of Mr Blue’s intention
would engage ToM capacities that would allow us to
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determine what he wanted to do. Here, a negative emotional
reaction is likely to arise from the representation of Mr Blue’s
intention (he wanted to push = he is bad). This negative emo-
tional reaction is either sustained or revised during the moral-
intentional evaluation that aims to assess, through additional
ToM computations, the agent’s ultimate intentions from a mor-
al standpoint (he wanted to push to cause harm = he is bad).
That is, one would bring together the initial intentional compu-
tation and other relevant contextual information to understand
the very nature of the agent’s intention (for instance Mr Blue
might have wanted to pushMr Red because he wanted to cause
harm or because he wanted to avoidMr Red being hit by a car).
Finally, the integration of these causal-moral and intentional-
moral evaluations in the final moral judgment should be rela-
tively straightforward in the case of intentional harm. The out-
puts of the different evaluative systems are of the same value
(cause = he is bad, intention = he is bad), and should thus
reinforce each other and lead us to evaluateMr Blue negatively.
In the case of accidental harm (Fig. 2b), we propose that
individuals typically generate a moral judgment as follows.
When Mr Blue commits accidental harm, the two first steps
involved in basic causal computation and causal-moral eval-
uations should be the same as the ones involved in the inten-
tional harm scenario described above and should thus give
rise to a negative output (cause = he is bad). Basic intentional
computation should also involve ToM capacities but should
result in a neutral output (e.g., Mr Blue wanted to swing).
From a moral standpoint, the intentional-moral evaluation
should also lead to neutral output (he did not want to cause
harm = he is not bad), which would then conflict with the
negative output arising from the causal-moral evaluation.
Here we would need to deploy inhibitory control resources
to inhibit the negative evaluation arising from the causal-
moral evaluation. Importantly, ToM computations should be
maintained during this process to provide the competing out-
put (he is not bad) that is prioritized over the output arising
from the causal-moral evaluation (he is bad). To summarize,
we propose that moral judgment of accidental harm arises
from the interplay between the negative emotional arousal
elicited by the victim’s suffering, ToM computations regard-
ing the Mr Blue’s intentions, and the deployment of inhibitory
control, which would enable the integration of the agent’s
neutral intention in the final moral evaluation.
In the case of attempted harm (Fig. 2c), we propose that
individuals typically generate a moral judgment as follows. In
contrast to the previous situations described, the basic causal
computation should yield nothing since the agent’s action
does not cause harm. The causal-moral evaluation should thus
remain dormant. However, the computations of the agent’s
intention by deployment of ToM capacities should generate
a negative emotional reaction via the emotional arousal elicit-
ed by the representation of the agent’s intention to cause harm
and thus the outcome desired by the agent. It should be noted
that in this case, individuals’ negative emotional reactions do
not rely on a basic mechanism of emotional contagion as in
the case of basic causal computation. Indeed, without overt
emotional cues, individuals’ affective reaction should rely on
individuals’ ability to infer what the other person is feeling
based on various non-emotional cues, by putting oneself in the
other’s place (i.e., affective perspective taking; Eisenberg,
Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991, see also Vaish, Carpenter &
Tomasello, 2009).
Like in the case of judgment of intentional harm, this neg-
ative emotional output is either sustained or revised through
additional ToM computations to morally evaluate the agent’s
intention (he wanted to push to cause harm = he is bad). Here,
there is no conflict with the output arising from the causal
evaluation (since the causal-moral evaluation is not triggered).
In this case, inhibitory control resources would not be neces-
sary and the final moral judgment should depend on the
intentional-moral evaluation alone (he is bad). To summarize,
moral judgment of attempted harm should mainly rely on
ToM capacities and emotional arousal resulting from ToM
computations.
In the ETIC model, we make several assumptions regard-
ing the cognitive architecture underlying the processing of
harmful situations that need to be examined in the light of
the existing literature. Notably, the model proposes that
causal-moral and intentional-moral evaluations are achieved
by distinct computations and that emotional arousal, ToM
capacities, and inhibitory control resources impact differently
on moral judgments about intentional harm, accidental harm,
and attempted harm. In contrast to Greene’s initial proposition
(Greene et al., 2004; Greene, 2009), the ETIC model assumes
that affective computations are not restricted to one type of
evaluation but are instead required for both the evaluation of
the agent’s causal role and of the agent’s intentions (Shenhav
& Greene, 2014). Importantly, the ETIC also differs from
Cushman’s model (Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013)
by being agnostic about the relative weight given to
Table 1 Outputs from causal/moral and intentional/moral evaluations depending on the situation perceived
Situation/evaluation Causal/moral evaluation Intentional/moral evaluation
Intentional Harm (negative intention and negative outcome) He caused harm = he is bad He wanted to cause harm = he is bad
Accidental Harm (neutral or positive intention and negative outcome) He caused harm = he is bad He did not want to cause harm = he is not bad
Attempted Harm (negative intention and no or neutral outcomes) He caused nothing He wanted to cause harm = he is bad
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information about intention and causation in judgments of
wrongness and punishment judgments.
In its current form, the ETIC model thus predicts that the
interaction between emotional arousal, ToM capacities, and
inhibitory control should be the same regardless of whether
an individual is asked to judge the wrongness of the action or
whether the action should result in a punishment (see Table 2,
for comprehensive predictions regarding Cushman and the
ETICmodels). However, since, very few studies have system-
atically compared different types of moral judgments (but see
Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013), it was not possible to
systematically explore the validity of those specific predic-
tions in our critical review. Furthermore, as will be discussed
further in section Moral judgement in typically developing
children, the ETIC model and Cushman’s model are not mu-
tually exclusive.
In the next section, we will address the validity of the ETIC
model by examining recent insights from cognitive psychology
and cognitive neuroscience regarding the cognitive computa-
tions and brain areas implicated in adults’ processing of
harmful situations.Wewill focus on the extant evidence regard-
ing the role of emotional arousal, ToM capacities, and inhibi-
tory control resources during moral judgments of accidental
and attempted harm as these allow us to dissect the cognitive
processes required for causal-moral and intentional-moral eval-
uations. We will not discuss situations involving intentional
harm as such situations do not enable the separation of the
cognitive processes required for causal-moral and intentional-
moral evaluations (as both causal-moral and intentional-moral
systems lead to the same output; see Cushman, 2008). We will
then evaluate themodel with findings from specific populations
of interest: typically developing children, individuals with psy-
chopathy, individuals with high levels of alexithymia, and in-
dividuals with autism. Finally, we will outline what critical
phenomena need to be investigated further and propose several
conceptual andmethodological improvements that we think are
required to (i) validate current models of moral cognition in a
more comprehensive way; and (ii) yield a more complete pic-
ture of the cognitive processes underlying moral judgment
about basic harmful action and moral behavior.
Table 2 Predictions made by the ETIC (E=emotional arousal, T=theory of mind, IC=inhibitory control) model and Cushman’s model of moral
judgment (based on Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2013)
Cushman’s model ETIC model
Common claims • Causal and intentional evaluations are underlied by distinct psychological systems.
• Causal and intentional evaluation can act in concert, in conflict or in competition.
Main assumptions
and predictions
• Judgment of wrongness based on the mental state that
determined the action
• Judgment of punishment based on causal responsibility
for harm and constrained by judgment of
intent/wrongness→ punishment judgment is more
influenced by causal responsibility than by the agent’s
intention to harm, as compared with wrongness
judgment
• ToM capacities and inhibitory control resources
probably help (but are not sufficient) to generate
intent-based moral judgment of attempted and
accidental harms
• The integration of the agent’s causal responsibility
into moral judgment depends on emotional arousal
• The integration of the agent’s harmful intention into
moral judgment depends on the interaction between
emotional arousal, ToM capacities
• The integration of the agent’s innocent intention
into moral judgment depends on the interaction
between emotional arousal, ToM capacities and
inhibitory control resources
Developmental predictions • Intent-based wrongness judgment mostly depends
on children’s conceptual achievements
• Intent-based judgment would first emerge for
wrongness judgment, then for punishment
judgment
• Children develop the ability to generate intent-based
moral judgment for attempted harm, alongside the
developement of ToM capacities
• Generation of intent-based moral judgment for
accidental harm develops later, with the the
development of inhibitory control resources
Individuals with ASD No clear predictions • Given ToM difficulties, individuals with ASD differ
from control participants when judging attempted
harm (less severely) and of accidental harm (more
severely)
Individuals with
psychopathy/alexithymia
No clear predictions • Given emotional difficulies, individuals with
psychopathy/alexithymia differ from control
participants when judging attempted harm (less
severely) and accidental harm (less severely)
Individuals with ADHD No clear predictions • Given inhibitory control difficulties, individuals
with ADHD differ from control participants when
judging accidental harm (more severely)
ToM Theory of Mind, ASD autism spectrum disorder, ADHD attention-deficity hyperactivity disorder
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Cognitive and neural architecture underlying moral
judgment about harmful situations: Insights
from adult samples
What processes underlie moral judgments of accidental
harm?
A recent study has investigated whether the integration of the
agent’s causal role and of the intention to harm were similar in
terms of their cognitive cost (Buon, Jacob, Loissel, &
Dupoux, 2013). In this study, adult participants made moral
judgments about agents who differed in their causal responsi-
bility in a victim’s suffering (one agent caused harm acciden-
tally while the other did not cause harm, but the victim hurt
him/herself; i.e., the conditions were matched for distress
cues) and about agents who differ on their intention to cause
harm (one agent caused harm intentionally while the other
caused harm accidentally). Critically, participants had to per-
form the task either under normal conditions or while engag-
ing in a verbal shadowing task, which substantially taxes ver-
bal and executive resources. When performing the task under
normal conditions, participants were not only able to integrate
both the agent’s causal responsibility and intention to harm in
their moral judgment, but also preferentially weighted the
agents’ intention. That is, participants were able to appropri-
ately judge accidental harm, exculpating the agent when he
had no intention to harm. This finding is in line with previous
research (Cushman, 2008; Piaget, 1932; Young et al., 2007)
and indicates that when judging accidental harm, adult par-
ticipants give priority to the agent’s innocent intention instead
of the agent’s causal role. In contrast, when participants
judged accidental harm under verbal shadowing, although
they were able to integrate the agent’s causal role in their
moral judgment and were able to compute the agent’s inten-
tions, they seemed unable to integrate the agent’s innocent
intentions in their moral judgment. That is, when processing
cases of accidental harm with diminished verbal and execu-
tive control resources, participants prioritized the agent’s caus-
al role instead of the agent’s innocent intention in their moral
judgments and did not exculpate the agent. This study sup-
ports the ETIC model, indicating that causal-moral and
intentional-moral evaluations rely on two separable cognitive
systems, which appear asymmetric in the degree to which they
require verbal and/or executive resources to be available to
integrate the causal and intentional evaluation outputs into a
final moral judgment.
According to the ETIC model, while emotional arousal
is a critical input to causal-moral evaluations, ToM capac-
ities and inhibitory control resources are necessary to gen-
erate intentional-moral evaluations and to integrate the
agent’s innocent intentions into moral judgment. In favor
of this proposal, neuroscientific evidence demonstrates that
processing accidental harm recruits brain regions typically
involved in affective processing (e.g., amydgala), ToM
computations (e.g., temporo-parietal junction), and conflict
processing/regulation (e.g., Anterior Cingulate Cortex). For
example, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
studies have demonstrated that when healthy adults judge
accidental harm (compared to intentional harm), there is
an increased neural response in the right temporo-parietal
junction (rTPJ) and in the right temporal pole, regions
that have been consistently associated with reasoning about
others’ mental states (Berthoz, Grèzes, Armony, Passingham,
& Dolan, 2006). Moreover, individuals who present higher
rTPJ responses during moral judgment of accidental harm
assign less blame to agents who cause harm accidently
(Young & Saxe, 2009). Although correlational, these findings
support the view that the neural circuitry typically engaged
during ToM processing is deployed during moral judgments
of accidental harm and is important for the integration of
information of the agent’s innocent intentions.
With regard to the importance of inhibitory control re-
sources, one fMRI study has reported that during moral
judgment of accidental harm (compared to intentional harm)
participants presented a pattern of brain responses (i.e., in-
creased recruitment of right inferior parietal cortex,
precuneus, bilateral anterior cingulate gyrus) similar to the
one observed by Greene et al. (2004) during Bhigh conflict
moral dilemmas^ which might be suggestive of a higher
cognitive conflict during moral judgment of accidental harm
(Young et al., 2007). Supporting this interpretation, several
studies have reported individuals to take substantially more
time to judge an agent for his accidental harm compared to
someone who committed intentional harm or attempted
harm (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Decety & Cacioppo, 2012;
Decety, Michalska, & Kinzler, 2011; Imamoğlu, 1975;
Young et al., 2007; Young & Saxe, 2009). A recent study
also provides evidence in favor of the importance of regula-
tory mechanisms when judging accidental harm (Treadway
et al., 2014). In this fMRI study, the authors observed that
when participants judged accidental harm, the dorsal anterior
cingulate cortex (dACC) exhibited top-down connectivity
with the amydgala. This suggests thus that the dACC may
have a critical role in regulating brain regions that are in-
volved in affective computations (Treadway et al., 2014).
Interestingly, additional connectivity analysis revealed that
when viewing accidental harm, the dACC received greater
input from the TPJ, which suggests that this top-down
dACC regulation would rest upon participants’ ToM infer-
ences regarding the agents’ mental states.
While encouraging and in line with the ETIC model,
it should be noted that systematic and independent be-
havioral assessments of the participants’ emotional reac-
tivity to other suffering, ToM and inhibitory control
skills are necessary to confirm this interpretation of
those neuro-functional data.
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What processes underlie judgment of attempted harm?
With respect to attempted harm, one experimental study has
demonstrated that judgment of attempted harm generated a
competition1 between causal evaluation and intentional eval-
uation (Cushman, 2008), which is in line with both the ETIC
and Cushman’s model. Indeed, when processing attempted
harm, and in contrast to cases of accidental harm, only one
system is busy, which prevents a conflict from occuring. In
this study, the author has reported significant differences in
judgments of deserved blame and punishment of someone
who fails to cause an intentional harm that does not occur,
as compared with judgments of someone who fails to cause an
intentional harm that does occur by some independent means.
When an agent commits a failed attempt but the harm occurs
by some independent means, causal responsibility is assigned
to the independent means, and assessment of the culpable
mental state of the agent is weighted less in the assignment
of blame. By contrast, when no harm at all occurs, causal
responsibility cannot be assigned. In these cases, an assess-
ment of mental culpability dominates, leading to more severe
judgments of punishment and blame with regard to the agent –
compared with the condition where harm occurs by indepen-
dent means. This Bblame blocking^ phenomenon demon-
strates that, in case of attempted harm, causal and intentional
moral evaluations are acting competitively to establish the
moral judgment, which strongly argues in favor of the idea
that causal and intentional evaluative systems rest upon sepa-
rable systems acting competitively.
In line with our model, neuroimaging studies seem to indi-
cate that brain regions that subserve affective processing and
ToM reasoning are also critical for appropriate moral
judgment of attempted harm. For example, Young et al.
(2007) observed that the rTPJ, a region typically engaged
during ToM tasks, is highly responsive during processing of
attempted harm (contrasted to intentional harm; Young et al.,
2007). Moreover, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS)
applied on the rTPJ appears to reduce participants’ ability to
blame an agent for attempted harm (Young, Camprodon,
Hauser, Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010). These findings sug-
gest that the rTPJ, a region that subserves ToM computations,
is critical for the proper evaluation of intention during moral
judgment of attempted harm (Young, Camprodon, Hauser,
Pascual-Leone, & Saxe, 2010).
Activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a
brain area involved in ToM and value computations (Young &
Saxe, 2009), has also been associated with the ability to blame an
agent for attempted harm. The critical importance of this brain
region in judgment of attempted harm has also been shown in
two studies with patients with vmPFC lesions acquired in adult-
hood (Ciaramelli, Braghittoni, & di Pellegrino, 2012; Young,
Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Hauser, 2010). In both studies,
vmPFC-lesion patients were less likely than controls to blame
an agent for attempted harm (i.e., when presented with attempted
harm, vmPFC patients were less likely to integrate agents’ harm-
ful intentions in their moral judgment). Ciaramelli et al. (2012)
suggested that inefficient ToM computations might explain the
atypical pattern of moral judgment in this population. However,
the failure to consider the agents’ intention was not seen when
intentions were neutral (i.e., in the case of accidental harm),
which suggests that ToMcomputations that also involve affective
valuation processes are selectively disrupted in vmPFC patients.
Young and collaborators (2010) have suggested that the vmPFC
may be critical for generating an emotional response from an
abstract representation (see also Sobhani & Bechara, 2012). In
other words, the vmPFC would be critical for negatively
Bcoloring^ the representation of the agent’s intent and this would
be an important input for computation of the agent’s
blameworthiness.
These data are in line with the model, suggesting that both
intact ToM capacities and affective responses are required to
blame an agent for attempted harm. However, additional stud-
ies are required to elucidate at what point ToM processes are
employed in moral judgment. That is, to elucidate whether
ToM processes are only deployed for making the basic inten-
tional computations or are also critical for making intentional-
moral evaluations.
Summary: Insights from studies of adult samples
The extant evidence reviewed so far is in line with the model
we have presented and suggests that: (i) separable systems are
responsible for the causal-moral and intentional-moral evalu-
ations in moral judgment; (ii) brain areas that have been con-
sistently associated with affective, ToM, and inhibitory con-
trol processes are involved in moral judgment of harmful sit-
uations; but (iii) the involvement of these different brain re-
gions differs as a function of the situation under evaluation.
While encouraging and in favor of our model and of the
implication of affective, ToM, and inhibitory control process-
es in moral judgment, some caution needs to be exerted when
interpreting neuroimaging data (Poldrack, 2006). For in-
stance, even though the role of the vmPFC in moral judgment
is well recognized, and most of the authors concur that the
vmPFC is important for affective computations, the precise
nature of these affective computations in moral judgment re-
mains to be established. It is possible that the vmPFC plays a
critical role the generation of emotional responses from ab-
stracts representations (Young et al. 2010), but it is also plau-
sible that it contributes to moral judgment by bringing
1 We used the term conflict when both systems are Bbusy^ (when there is
a causal analysis to be performed, i.e., a harm has been caused) as well as
an intentional state to be processed. In contrast, we used the word com-
petition when only one system is busy. In this case, there is no conflict
between the two systems but there is still a competition for the resources
involved.
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affective valuations to decision-making processes (Shenhav&
Greene, 2014) or through affective regulation (Ciaramelli,
Braghittoni and di Pellegrino, 2012). Furthermore, some
authors have also highlighted possible non-affective contribu-
tions that the vmPFC might make to moral cognition (e.g.,
self-projection; Ciaramelli & di Pellegrino, 2011) (see
Mitchell, 2009 for a similar point with respect to the rTPJ).
The fMRI data reported above thus may be insufficient to
precisely demonstrate which computations (but also, at what
point of the information processing chain) are critical when
making moral judgments of accidental and attempted harm.
In the following section we will review studies that have
focused on moral judgment during different periods of typical
development. Emotional arousal, ToM, and inhibitory control
capacities undergo substantial development throughout child-
hood and adolescence and this may help explain developmen-
tal differences in moral judgment and clarify the role of these
different processes in moral judgment.
Moral judgement in typically developing children
Emotional response to others’ distress, ToM, and inhibitory
control capacities undergo substantive changes throughout
childhood and adolescence. Developmental studies can thus
provide a unique opportunity to assess the interplay of the
different components of the ETIC model, in ways that are
not possible in adults when all these components are fully
mature and operational (de Haan & Gunnar, 2009).
To provide context, we will briefly examine the develop-
mental course of the processes that we hypothesize to be at
work in moral judgment computations.
The capacity for vicariously sharing the affective state of
another emerges early during development. Early signs of emo-
tional arousal in response to others’ suffering can already be seen
in newborns, and it has been shown that infants become vicari-
ously distressed when another infant begins to cry (Dondi,
Simion, & Caltran, 1999). Even though the very nature of those
affective reactions remains highly debated (Davidov, Zahn-
Waxler, Roth-Hanania, & Knafo, 2013; Heiphetz & Young,
2014), this indicates that, by an early age, infants may show
sensitivity to the negative nature of harmful outcomes, when
perceive harmful interactions. Furthermore, before 1 year of
age, evidence indicates that infants are able to track the causal
structure of an event that modifies the physical state of an object
(Muentener &Carey, 2010). It suggests that preverbal infants are
not only able to track the harmful outcomes of an agent’s action
but may also be sensitive to the causal relationship linking an
agent and its (negative) impact on another’s emotional state.
With age, reactions to others’ suffering become increasingly so-
phisticated. Toddlers begin to be able to distinguish between
different emotional expressions and, later on, to label others’
emotions (Walle & Campos, 2012). Around the age of 2 years,
with the development of the ability to distinguish the self from
others, children begin to be able to differentiate between their
own from others’ internal states, and start displaying behavioral
expression of empathic concern (i.e., helping / comforting be-
haviors) (Decety, 2010; Roth-Hanania, Davidov, & Zahn-
Waxler, 2011). Importantly, at about the same age, toddlers seem
to be able to express empathic concern towards victims of harm-
ful actions who do not express overt emotional expressions
(Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009).
Regarding the development of ToM capacities, even though
there are studies suggesting that preverbal infants display some
sensitivity to others’ mental states such as others’ goals, beliefs,
and false beliefs (Baillargeon, Scott, & He, 2010; Onishi &
Baillargeon, 2005), it seems that ToM capacities such as the
ability to infer desires, intentions, beliefs, and false beliefs are
typically acquired and expressed between the age of 3 and 5 years
(Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). However, it is important to
keep in mind that flexible deployment of ToM, as well as more
sophisticated ToM reasoning, continue to develop until mid-
adolescence (Apperly, Warren, Andrews, Grant, & Todd, 2011;
Dumontheil, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010).
Finally, the development of inhibitory control follows a
protracted time-course. Although early signs of inhibitory control
skills already emerge during the first few years of life, inhibitory
control capacities undergo significant development throughout
childhood and adolescence (Best & Miller, 2010). Between the
age of 5 and 8 years, children show significant improvements in
complex inhibition tasks (i.e., tasks that require the inhibition of a
pre-potent response and the generation of an alternative response)
as new inhibitory control strategies come on line and can be
deployed (Carlson, 2005; Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994).
Improvements in accuracy when performing inhibitory control
tasks take place throughout adolescence, likely due to increasing
efficiency in inhibitory control, rather than development of new
inhibitory control capacities per se (Bunge, Dudukovic,
Thomason, Vaidya, & Gabrieli, 2002; Romine & Reynolds,
2005).
These distinct developmental trajectories enable us to draw
different predictions regarding the development of the ability to
integrate causal-moral and intentional-moral evaluations in
moral judgment of different situations of harm. First, based
on the development of emotional arousal to a victim’s suffer-
ing, we would expect pre-schoolers’ moral judgment to be
mostly sensitive to the agent’s causal role. With the emergence
of ToM capacities, we would expect that these children will
increasingly generate intentional-moral evaluations, but only
when the situation does not require them to resolve a conflict
that necessitates the deployment of inhibitory control resources.
Therefore, at around the age of 5 years, children should be able
to blame agents who attempt to commit harm but their inhibi-
tory control skills should be insufficiently developed to inte-
grate the agent’s innocent intentions in accidental harm, which
requires the inhibition of the causal-moral evaluation. At this
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age, they should thus not be able to reliably judge accidental
harm and should evaluate it more severely than adults. The
ability to integrate the moral-intentional evaluation of acciden-
tal harm into moral judgment, and thus to generate an intent-
based moral judgment when faced with accidental harm,
should come online later, along with the protracted develop-
ment of inhibitory control resources.
What is the evidence in favor of this prediction? The first
well-known investigations of the development of intent-based
moral judgment were conducted by Piaget (1932). He report-
ed that children were not able to prioritize the agent’s inten-
tions before the age of 7 or 9 years. However, these initial
findings have been largely criticized (for a review, see
Karniol, 1978). Methodological changes in subsequent stud-
ies have allowed developmental psychologists to show that
children are indeed able to distinguish intentional from acci-
dental harm between the age of 3 and 5 years, depending on
whether the agent’s mental states are presented in a very ex-
plicit and salient way, and on how salient and available the
information is regarding the outcomes that children have to
compare (Baird & Astington, 2004; Hebble, 1971; Nelson,
1980; Nelson-le Gall, 1985; Nobes, Panagiotaki, & Pawson,
2009; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996). The fact that increasing
the saliency of the agent’s mental state and reducing the sa-
liency of the outcomes enables younger children to take inten-
tions into account in their moral judgments, indirectly favors
the hypothesis that ToM and inhibitory control are critical to
generate intent-based moral judgment. It is possible that
young children are only able to integrate information about
intentions in their moral judgments when this information is
explicit because it reduces the need for them to use their not
yet fully developed ToM competences to make an appropriate
judgment. It is also possible that when the consequences are
attenuated, absent, or at least kept constant across conditions,
the conflict that occurs between the information about the
agent's intent and the outcomes of his/her actions is attenuated,
which reduces the need to deploy inhibitory skills, making the
task possible for young children who have not yet developed
these skills.
At 5 years, however, children’s moral judgments are
not yet comparable with adults’ moral judgments. Until
the age of 7–9 years there appears to be increasingly
reliable use of the agent’s intention and a decrease in
the dominance of causal computations to judge harmful
actions (Cushman et al. 2013; Hebble, 1971; Imamoğlu,
1975; Nobes et al., 2009; Zelazo et al., 1996). For exam-
ple, Cushman et al. (2013) explored children’s individual
judgments (that is, judgments that are made about each
agent separately instead of comparative judgments where
the child is asked to compare two agents) about attempted
harm and accidental harm in well-controlled scenarios
where the intention to cause harm was not overly explicit.
They found that the increasing propensity to favor the
agent’s intention in moral judgment was mostly explained
by the growing ability to integrate the agent’s innocent
intentions, enabling the exculpation of agents that perpe-
trate accidental harm. In other words, it seems that by the
age of 5 years, children are more likely to form appropri-
ate severe moral judgments about those agents who at-
tempt to harm someone than to appropriately exculpate
an agent who commits accidental harm; the ability to ex-
culpate agents who cause accidental harm only seems to
be reliably achieved around the age of 7–9 years (see also
Hebble, 1971, for a similar developmental trend). Even
though these findings remain to be replicated using other
types of well-controlled stimuli, they are in line with the
hypothesis made by our model, and suggest that the inte-
gration in moral judgment of an agent’s harmful intention
is Bonline^ before the ability to integrate an agent’s harm-
less intent, which we propose is reliant on more developed
inhibitory control resources.
Below, we will overview data from experiments that have
explored more directly the role of emotional arousal, ToM,
and inhibitory control in the development of moral judgment
of harmful situations. Regarding the role of emotional arousal
in early moral judgment, Killen, Lynn Mulvey, Richardson,
Jampol, and Woodward (2011) have shown that children who
endorse cause-based judgments when faced with accidental
harm (i.e., who blamed the agent) tend to justify the punish-
ment of the agent more in terms of harm caused to the victim,
than their peers who endorse intent-based moral judgment
(i.e., who exculpate the agent). While this result suggests that
the welfare of the victim is a critical feature for young chil-
dren’s moral judgments, it does not specify that the emotional
arousal to the victim’s suffering is the critical input for the
formation of their judgment. A recent study by Decety,
Michalska, and Kinzler (2011) sheds more light on this issue.
The authors have employed an fMRI task with non-verbal
stimuli of harmful situations to assess moral processing in a
sample spanning a wide age range. They have also recorded
pupillary dilation, an index of general affective arousal, during
task performance. During the observation of accidental harm,
but not of intentional harm, pupillary dilatation was negatively
associated with age, suggesting that arousal to accidental harm
selectively decreases with age. Whether this diminished emo-
tional arousal rests upon the development of inhibitory control
skills remains to be explored in further studies. Similarly, this
study has shown interesting neurodevelopmental changes in
structures typically involved in affective saliency (i.e., amyg-
dala and insula); response in these areas decreased with age.
Even though these data remain correlational, it suggests that
processing moral situations is more dependent upon basic af-
fective responses in younger participants than in older
participants.
Regarding the role of ToM capacities in the development of
intent-based moral judgment, Baird and Astington (2004)
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have reported a positive correlation between 4- to 5-year-olds’
performance at the classical False Belief Task (FBT)2 and their
ability to distinguish two agents performing similar actions
based on their good or bad intentions. Killen, Lynn Mulvey,
Richardson, Jampol and Woodward (2011) have focussed on
children’s judgments of accidental harm and have demonstrat-
ed that 3- to 5-year-old children who pass the FBT are more
likely than their peers to consider the intention of an agent
committing accidental harm as Ball right,^ and less likely than
their peer to consider the punishment of such an agent as
acceptable. In other words, ToM abilities, at least as assessed
by the FBT, appear to be critical for considering the agent’s
intentions and for exculpating the agent who caused acciden-
tal harm.
The extant developmental findings reported here are in line
with the assumptions made by our model. Developmental
findings, however, remain incomplete and at times difficult
to interpret. In particular, it is important to keep in mind that
the FBT is not sensitive to quantifying individual differences
in ToM across a wide developmental age. Children who are
older than 5 years typically pass the task, yet as detailed
above, the ability to generate a fully mature intent-basedmoral
judgment occurs only around age 7–9 years. We also know
that children’s FBT performance is correlated with their inhib-
itory control resources (Apperly, Riggs, Simpson, Chiavarino,
& Samson, 2006; Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004). In order
to clarify the relative contributions of ToM and inhibitory
control on the development of moral judgment, further studies
need to employ ToM tasks that capture individual differences
in deploying mentalising computations across different ages
and which do not have an inhibitory control element (Apperly
et al., 2011; Dumontheil et al. 2010) or need to include addi-
tional inhibitory control conditions/tasks to enable researchers
to disentangle the contribution of inhibitory control on the
reported associations. In addition, the impact of inhibitory
control skills on the development of intent-based moral judg-
ment, even though previously suggested (Cushman et al.,
2013; Zelazo et al., 1996), has not yet been directly investi-
gated (but see Gvozdic, Moutier, Dupoux, & Buon, 2016, for
recent experimental evidence in this direction). Ideally, future
studies should investigate the development of intent-based
moral judgment together with a direct assessment of all the
component processes that are purported to be important for
moral computations (i.e., emotional arousal, ToM capacities,
and inhibitory control).
Finally, it should be noted that recent studies indicate that
infants and toddlers can be sensitive to the agent’s intentions
over the agent’s causal role with regard to negative outcomes
(Hamlin, 2013; Hamlin, Ullman, Tenenbaum, Goodman, &
Baker, 2013; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010),
However, these studies differ from the work with child and
adult samples in several ways (Buon et al., sous presse;
Margoni & Surian, 2016), which means that it is not possible
to directly compare them to these studies. For example, the
infant studies have typically depicted scenarios with salient
intentional cues and have not included explicit information
about the affective outcomes of the actions to the victim (such
as distress cues). It is therefore not possible to conclude
whether the infant studies have probed infants’ ability to track
and evaluate harmful agents or merely uncooperative ones. In
most of these studies, participants were shown agents whose
actions were performed with the intention to help or hinder
another agent to achieve a goal. Even though it might be
uncomfortable to not achieve a goal, it is unlikely that this
negative outcome is comparable to the physical harm
portrayed in the studies with older children or adults described
above (see Buon et al., 2014 for a similar argument). Given
these differences in the stimuli used to probe infants’ and older
children’s evaluative abilities, it is possible that a discrepancy
between findings of infants’ and children’s socio-moral com-
petencies reflects the nature and intensity of the conflict in-
duced by the stimuli used in these studies (agent’s intentions
are less difficult to deduce in infant studies). Further studies
that systematically and parametrically manipulate the salience
and nature of the agents’ causal role and intention should shed
more light on this issue. Finally, in the infant and toddler studies
their social behavior is used as an index of their moral judgment
(e.g., grasping one of the two agents presented; helping behav-
ior).While social behavior has been interpreted as a precursor of
moral judgment abilities, this assumption remains to be
established empirically by exploring longitudinally whether
infants’ and toddlers’ early social behaviors predict their moral
judgments abilities later on (see Apperly & Butterfill, 2009;
Yamaguchi, Kuhlmeier, Wynn, & vanMarle, 2009, for
comparable debate regarding early vs. late ToM competencies).
Insights from clinical populations
We will now turn to clinical populations to explore whether
they can provide more insights regarding the processes impli-
cated in the computation of moral judgment of harmful
actions.
2 In the most common version of the FBT, children are shown a story
involving two characters. For example, the child is shown two dolls, Sally
and Anne, who have a basket and a box, respectively. Sally also has a
marble, which she places in her basket, and then leaves the room. While
she is out of the room, Anne takes the marble from the basket and puts it
in the box. Sally returns, and the child is then asked where Sally will look
for themarble. The child passes the task if she answers that Sally will look
for the marble in the basket where she put it; the child fails the task if she
answers that Sally will look in the box, where the child knows the marble
is hidden, even though Sally cannot know this, since she did not see it
hidden there. To pass the task, the child must be able to understand that
another person’s mental representation of a situation can be different from
his or her own, and the child must be able to predict behaviour based on
that understanding.
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The importance of affective processes in moral judgment
abilities: Investigating psychopathy and alexithymia
Individuals with psychopathy are of particular interest for in-
vestigating the importance of basic emotional processes in the
ability to judge harmful actions. Psychopathy is a personality
disorder that involves emotional dysfunction, including di-
minished empathy, reduced guilt, and lack of attachment to
other people (Blair, 1995; Viding, McCrory & Seara-Cardoso,
2014). Individuals with psychopathy are substantially more
likely than typical individuals to engage in amoral and antiso-
cial behavior. Several decades of experimental research have
probed the deficits of individuals with psychopathy and have,
for example, documented reduced autonomic responses to the
distress of others and reduced recognition of others’ sad and
fearful (and possibly other) expressions (Blair, 2013; Dolan &
Fullam, 2010). In contrast, individuals with psychopathy do
not appear to have impairments in ToM and inhibitory control
tasks, as long as these tasks do not require processing of af-
fective content (Blair, Marsh, Finger, Blair, & Luo, 2006;
Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007).
Another interesting population for the study of morality are
individuals with a high level of alexithymia. Alexithymia is a
subclinical personality construct characterized by a reduced
capacity to experience emotions, absence of tendency to re-
flect on one’s own emotions, difficulty in identifying feelings
and bodily sensations associated with emotional arousal, and
in describing these feelings to other despite a basic awareness
of bodily arousal and sensation (Lane, Ahern, Schwartz, &
Kaszniak, 1997). At a cognitive level, elevated traits of
alexithymia are associated with impaired performance on a
number of important social cognitive tasks, including emotion
recognition (Cook, Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013) and empathy
(Bird et al., 2010; Moriguchi et al., 2007).
Even though the nature and the origin of the emotional
impairment in these two populations differs in several ways
(Bird &Viding, 2014), both individuals with psychopathy and
those with high levels of alexithymia have been reported to
have impaired emotional arousal to others’ distress, a compo-
nent which is critical for the ETIC model. According to our
model, emotional arousal to a victim’s distress (perceived or
imagined) is an important process when making moral evalu-
ations about causal responsibility and harmful intent.
Therefore, we predict that both individuals with psychopathy
and those with high levels of alexithymia should be impaired
at generating moral judgments about accidental and attempted
harm. More specifically, individuals with psychopathy and
individuals with high levels of alexithymia should judge the
agents that have perpetrated accidental or attempted harm less
severely than healthy controls. Young, Kruepke, and Newman
(2012) have found that individuals with psychopathy are more
likely than controls to consider the action of someone com-
mitting accidental harm as permissible. Patil and Silani (2014)
have also found that people with higher alexithymia scores are
more likely to find accidental harm more acceptable than
those with lower levels of such traits. These interesting find-
ings suggest that these individuals prioritize the intentional-
moral evaluation over the causal-moral evaluation more than
controls do, possibly because the victim’s distress cues does
not influence their moral judgment.
In contrast, Young et al. (2012) did not find a difference
between individuals with psychopathy and typically develop-
ing individuals in judging attempted harm (but see Trémolière
& Djeriouat, 2016). Similarly, Patil and Silani (2014) do not
find that individual differences in alexithymia related to how
likely people were to find attempted harm acceptable. These
findings are more puzzling to explain and do not appear to be
in line with our claim about the role that emotional arousal
plays in moral judgment of attempted harm. It is possible that
individuals with psychopathy and high alexithymia traits use
alternative cognitive strategies to appropriately blame an
agent who attempts harm despite their impaired affective re-
sponse when representing the agent’s intentions. This strategy
could rest upon the application of general abstract rules about
what is Bright^ and what is Bwrong.^ This hypothesis is in line
with the idea that individuals with psychopathy may use an
alternative cognitive route when processing moral content
(Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010; Glenn, Raine, Schug,
Young, & Hauser, 2009; Tassy, Oullier, Cermolacce, &
Wicker, 2009). In other words, it is possible that individuals
with high levels of psychopathy or alexithymia are able to
represent the content of an agent’s intention (to cause harm)
and to use this representation of an intention that is Bwrong^
and Bagainst societal rules^ for the purpose of moral judgment
– but without any emotional aversion to this representation.
An important avenue for future research would be to explore
the ability of individuals with basic emotional arousal impair-
ments to generate moral judgments under different cognitive
load conditions. More than allowing us to understand the role
of automatic emotional processes in judging harmful inten-
tions, such studies may help us to shed a new light on the
dissociation between Bknowing^ and Bcaring^ that is usually
observed in these populations (Cima et al., 2010).
The importance of Theory of Mind (ToM) capacities
in moral judgment abilities: Individuals with high
functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger syndrome (AS)
Another clinical population that is of particular interest for the
purpose of validating the assumptions made by our model are
individuals with high functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger
syndrome (AS). These individuals, despite having spared in-
tellectual abilities, unimpaired psychophysiological response
to others’ suffering (Blair, 1999; Sigman, Dissanayake,
Corona, & Espinosa, 2003), and inhibitory control resources
(for review see Russo et al., 2007), have well-documented
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ToM impairments (Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002;
Gilbert, Jones, & Happe, 2010; Happé, 1994). Individuals
with HFA/AS (unlike subjects with low functioning autism)
usually pass first- and second-order ToM tasks (Bauminger &
Kasari, 1999; Happe, 1995), likely using compensatory verbal
strategies (Happe, 1995). However, in more advanced ToM
tasks, such as the Strange Stories Task or the Faux Pas Task,3
they typically reveal their difficulties in reasoning about
others’ mental states (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Jones,
Stone, & Plaisted, 1999; Happé, 1994; Zalla, Sav, Stopin,
Ahade, & Leboyer, 2009).
According to our model, given their ToM deficit, individ-
uals with HFA/AS should present difficulties in integrating
both harmful and harmless intentions of an agent. Partially
in line with these predictions, recent studies have reported that
individuals with HFA/AS judge an agent committing acciden-
tal harm more severely than do healthy comparison individ-
uals (Buon, Dupoux, Jacob, Chaste, & Leboyer, 2013; Moran,
Young, Saxe, Lee, O’Young, Mavros, & Gabrieli, 2011). This
finding has been reported in two different studies using two
different types of stimuli (non-verbal dynamic stimuli and
verbal stimuli). Importantly, this impairment seems to relate
to basic intentional computation of the agents’ innocent inten-
tions but also extends to the integration of an agent’s inten-
tional cues into moral judgments. Indeed, Buon, Dupoux,
et al. (2013), using non-verbal dynamic stimuli, have shown
that individuals with HFA/AS are less likely than controls to
correctly interpret the agent’s intentions. However, the authors
have also demonstrated that even when individuals with HFA/
AS are able to report the agent’s intentional states, their judg-
ments about accidental harm are still more severe than that of
control participants. These findings suggest that ToM capaci-
ties are important for computing basic intentional computa-
tions as well as intentional-moral evaluations.
Our model also predicts that individuals with HFA/AS
would judge attempted harm less severely than healthy
controls. This is because the ETIC model predicts that
the intention to harm another person would not be com-
puted and integrated as reliably by individuals with ToM
impairments as it would be by individuals with intact
ToM abilities. However, contrary to this prediction a re-
cent study reported comparable moral evaluations of
attempted harm for HFA/AS and typically developing in-
dividuals (Moran et al., 2011). Findings from this study
suggest that individuals with HFA/AS are able to (i) make
basic intentional computations about the agent’s harmful
intent and (ii) evaluate them from a moral standpoint.
However, we are not entirely sure that the findings by
Moran and colleagues can be interpreted in such a
straightforward fashion. In the task used in this study all
the elements required to compute the agent’s intentions are
verbal and explicit, making the harmful intention of the
agent readily accessible – i.e., the computation of intent
under these tasks conditions is unlikely to be challenging
for individuals with HFA/AS. In addition, once the agent’s
harmful intention is successfully computed, integrating this
intention into moral judgment is not cognitively taxing as
the representation of the agent’s intention does not enter
into conflict with the output of the causal evaluation (as in
the case for accidental harm). Indeed, it has been proposed
that ToM computations/capacities required to properly
judge an agent causing accidental harm would need to
be more robust than the ones implicated in judging
attempted harm (Young & Saxe, 2009). In the case of
accidental harm, the representation of the agent’s intention
needs to be sustained against the conflict caused by the
representation of the agent’s causal role. In case of
attempted harm, the agent fails to hurt the intended victim
and no actual distress cues or physical outcomes actively
conflict with the representation of the agent’s intention.
Therefore, one may propose that compensatory mecha-
nisms of individuals with HFA/AS are sufficient to com-
pute and integrate the agent’s harmful intent (particularly
if the task format minimizes the requirements for comput-
ing intent) but perhaps not enough to generate apparent
normal judgment when processing accidental harm. If this
hypothesis is correct, one might also expect individuals
with low functioning autism or with lower verbal abilities
(e.g., younger children with HFA or AS) to be impaired in
providing typical moral judgment of situations involving
of attempted harm. Another interesting possibility would
be that the spared ability to judge attempted harm in in-
dividuals with HFA/AS relies on their intact emotional
arousal toward others’ suffering. To provide context, it
has been proposed that that during childhood, the aversive
response that is repeatedly associated with intrinsically
harmful acts (e.g., hitting, shooting) leads children to form
an automatic response to such actions (Cushman, Gray,
Gaffey, & Mendes, 2012). This suggests thus that once
this emotional conditioning has taken place, individuals
are able to generate negative evaluations to those type of
actions without any additional computation. By contrast,
blaming an agent who tried to cause harm through an
action that did not typically lead to harmful outcomes
during the development (e.g., pulling a lever) would re-
quire individuals to engage in ToM computations, enabling
them to represent the victim’s distress. According to this
hypothesis, appropriate judgments of individuals with
HFA/AS toward attempted harm should be restricted to
familiar harmful actions (i.e., those that have been nega-
tively reinforced during the development).
3 In the Strange Stories task, participants typically have to identify com-
plex social situations of bluff/double bluff, irony. In the Faux Pas task,
people have to recognize and explain a Faux Pas, a socially awkward or
tactless act, especially one that violates accepted social norms, standard
customs, or the rules of etiquette.
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The importance of inhibitory control in moral judgment
abilities: Need for evidence from populations
with inhibitory control deficits
Regarding the importance of inhibitory control resources
in moral judgment’s abilities, one population that is of
particular interest are individuals with attention deficit/
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Children with ADHD
present symptoms of inattention, hyperactivity, and/or im-
pulsivity (Kuntsi et al., 2014). At the cognitive level, chil-
dren with ADHD are more likely to present deficits in
response inhibition, planning, and cognitive flexibility
when compared to control children (Willcutt et al.,
2005). Exploring these children’s ability to generate moral
judgments could thus help us to understand the importance
of inhibitory control in moral judgment abilities.
According to our model, a cognitive profile marked by
impaired inhibitory control skills should lead to more se-
vere moral judgments of accidental harm: it should be
more difficult for these individuals to inhibit their emo-
tional reaction to the harm that is caused to the victim. To
date, and to the best of our knowledge, no study has
directly explored moral judgment of accidental (or
attempted) harm in this population.
Insights from clinical populations: Summary
Extant findings from clinical populations enabled us to further
evaluate our theoretical proposition. Atypical moral judgment
of accidental harm seen in individuals with psychopathy and
high levels of alexithymia (i.e., who judge less severely agents
who commit accidental harm) provides support in favor of the
prediction that intact affective processing of distress’ cues
may be crucial for the evaluation of an agent’s causal role in
effecting harm. The atypical profile of moral judgment seen in
individuals with HFA/AS when faced with accidental harm
provide evidence in favor of the prediction of our model that
ToM capacities may be critical for generating intentional/
moral evaluations and for the integration of agents’ innocent
intentions into moral judgment. Findings from individuals
who have HFA/AS add to the evidence base from fMRI stud-
ies, which indicate that brain areas associated with ToM pro-
cessing, including rTPJ, are implicated in the ability to excul-
pate an agent for his accidental harm, and with developmental
studies that have demonstrated that the ability to pass the false
belief task is significantly related to the ability to exculpate an
agent who has committed accidental harm. Further empirical
research is required to explore whether individuals with psy-
chopathy and HFA/AS use the same cognitive mechanisms as
typical individuals when they process attempted harm.
Insights from inhibitory disorders, such as ADHD, are cur-
rently lacking and could provide an interesting further avenue
for testing the model.
Future directions
In this paper, we presented a model where the ability to gen-
erate appropriate moral judgments of harmful actions relies on
separable evaluative processes in which emotional arousal to
others’ distress, ToM capacities, and inhibitory control re-
sources play a critical role. The findings we reviewed from
cognitive psychology, neuroscience, developmental psychol-
ogy, and clinical populations provide tentative support in fa-
vor of the model. However, a number of questions still need to
be addressed in future studies to validate the model in a more
comprehensive way.
The role of affective processing in integrating information
about the agent’s causal role and intention to harm
into moral judgment
In our model, affective processes are proposed to be critical
for both the evaluation of the agent’s harmful causal role and
the evaluation of the agent’s harmful intent to moral judgment.
Specifically, we argue that the emotional arousal triggered by
the perception of a victim’s suffering is required to assign
blame to an agent for the harm caused. Furthermore, we pro-
pose that the same type of affective response is critical for the
sensitivity to the agent’s harmful intention by allowing indi-
viduals to ‘negatively color’ the representation of the agent’s
intention. Importantly, in our model, the negative emotional
state that arises from the perception (in case of actual/
intentional and accidental harm) or the imagination (in case
of attempted harm) of the victim’s suffering provides the crit-
ical input for valuing the agent’s moral statue. Findings on
adults with psychopathy and those with high levels of
alexithymia (i.e., populations with blunted (psychopathy)
and/or undifferentiated (alexithymia) emotional responses)
suggest that intact processing of others’ distress/suffering is
critical when computing the agents’ causal role. Despite these
findings in favor of our initial assumptions, further studies are
required to understand the precise role of an intact response to
distress cues in the moral computation of the agent’s causal
role. For instance, distress cues could mainly act as salient
features that automatically trigger the individuals’ attention
towards the immoral actions and lead individuals to prioritize
the agent’s causal role. If the role of emotional arousal is
restricted to its role in directing attention (Decety et al.,
2011), one should expect emotional response to occur prior
to any moral evaluations. If a moral task was embedded with
an attentional cuing paradigm to orient individuals’ intention
towards the victim’s suffering, one may expect participants to
be able to evaluate the agent’s causal role despite blunted or
undifferentiated affective response (see Meffert, Gazzola, den
Boer, Bartels, & Keysers, 2013, for findings that suggest that
this may be the case).
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With respect to the ability to integrate the agents’ harmful
intent into moral judgments, we found little support in favor of
the assumption that emotional arousal in response to (the rep-
resentation of) others’ suffering is required for judging
attempted harm (i.e., both individuals with psychopathy and
those with high levels of alexithymia seem to be comparable
to healthy controls in judging attempted harm). We reported
that vmPFC patients, who are also thought to present affective
impairments, do present atypical judgments of attempted harm
and seem to be less likely than controls to judge this type of
harm as morally wrong (Ciaramelli et al., 2011; Young,
Bechara, Tranel et al., 2010). However, given the heterogene-
ity of the vmPFC’s functions (see summary section Summary:
Insights from studies of adult samples) current findings are not
sufficiently clear-cut to identify which specific process or pro-
cesses underlie both typical and atypical pattern ofmoral judg-
ment of attempted harm in vmPFC patients. In order to under-
stand whether emotional arousal to others’ suffering is critical
for generating moral judgment about attempted harm, the first
step would be to systematically and more directly explore
individuals’ affective response when they judge agents that
have attempted to harm. The effect of other manipulations
on judgment about attempted harm should also be explored.
One may, for instance, wonder if modulating the status of the
target of the harmful intent (previous research has demonstrat-
ed that people show greater sensitivity for the suffering of in-
group compared with out-group members for instance, e.g.,
Gutsell & Inzlicht, 2012) has an effect on the blame assigned
to the perpetrator of the action.
The role and nature of ToM mechanisms in moral
judgments
The second question that should be addressed in future re-
search is the role and nature of the ToM mechanisms in the
ability to generate intent-based moral judgments. The results
we report above from fMRI, developmental psychology, and
clinical studies strongly argue in favor of ToM capacities be-
ing important for generating intent-based moral evaluations.
However, we also reported counterintuitive findings from a
study, which showed that individuals with AS are impaired
in moral judgment of accidental harm but not of attempted
harm. This allows us to propose two contrastive hypothesis :
First, in line with Young & Saxe (2009), that ToM computa-
tions need to be more Brobust^ to integrate moral evaluations
of the agents’ innocent intentions than to integrate moral eval-
uations of agents’ harmful intentions into moral judgment.
Second, it may be possible that the need for adults to engage
in ToM computations for blaming attempted harm depend on
the type of actions performed by the agent. Whereas this later
hypothesis allowed us to make precise predictions that may be
tested by systematically varying the nature of the actions (i.e.,
whether the action evaluated have been systematically and
repeatedly associated with harmful outcomes during the de-
velopment, see section The importance of Theory of Mind
(ToM) capacities in moral judgment abilities: Individuals with
high functioning autism (HFA) and Asperger syndrome (AS),
the first hypothesis requires us to consider ToM broadly, with
regards to all the facets this concept may reflect.
Indeed, as outlined by Apperly (2012), ToM refers to a set
of representations, conditions and cognitive processes (e.g.
inhibitory control, language, memory) that allow people to
compute what others are thinking during everyday interac-
tions. ToM capacities also relate to the conceptual understand-
ing of the key notions of desires, intentions, knowledge and
beliefs, as well as the way in which these concepts are inter-
related – likely a result of a developmental history of making
computations of other people’s mental states. Finally, there
can be substantial individual differences in how motivated
people are to mentalize about other people’s desires and be-
liefs (i.e., trait-like tendency for paying attention to or caring
about what others think;Meins & Fernyhough, 1999). Thus, it
will be of interest to assess which aspects of ToM capacities
account for: (i) inter-individual differences in ToM reasoning
in relation to moral judgments; and (ii) the differential in-
volvement of ToM capacities in the integration of agents’
harmful and innocent intents. For example, do individual dif-
ferences in judgment of accidental harm stem from individual
differences in the motivation to use ToM to explain others
behavior, from individual differences in the flexible use of
ToM concepts, or perhaps from a combination of the two?
We hypothesize that ToM capacities need to be more Brobust^
in moral judgment of accidental harm than in moral judgment
of attempted harm. The notion of robustness, however, re-
mains to be defined and future work should explore more
precisely whether integrating the agent’s harmful and harm-
less intentions rely on distinct conceptual tools, yield different
processing costs, and/or are potentially differentially influ-
enced by motivational factors. Further studies using para-
digms that assess different aspects of ToM and moral judg-
ment tasks simultaneously are thus needed to clearly isolate
the role of ToM capacities in moral judgments of typical adults
as well as individuals with autism.
Exploring the contribution of inhibitory control resources
Evidence in favor of the importance of inhibitory control re-
sources is relatively limited and remains indirect (Treadway
et al., 2014; Young et al., 2007). Future studies need to directly
investigate the impact of these skills on moral judgment com-
putations. Providing a direct association between inhibitory
control skills and lenient judgment about accidental harm
would argue in favor of the ETIC model of morality. Future
work in experimental psychology should also directly manip-
ulate inhibitory control resources (Houdé & Borst, 2014) to
explore their impact on moral decision making (see for
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instance Gvozdic et al., 2016). However, given the important
contribution of inhibitory control skills in the subcomponents
of the ETICmodel (and especially ToM capacities; Apperly &
Butterfill, 2009; Carlson et al., 2004), this would not be suffi-
cient to demonstrate that inhibitory control contributes active-
ly and selectively to override the prepotent response triggered
by the perception of agent’s harmful causal role. For instance,
without controlling for the ability to detect the agent’s inten-
tion, one may argue that inhibitory control skills are required
to disengage individuals from the processing of the harmful
outcomes, allowing them to engage in computations about the
agent’s intention (i.e., inhibition would be required before any
basic intentional computation and would be required to prop-
erly detect the agent’s intentions). Another plausible scenario
would be that inhibitory control resources are only required to
accomplish complex and sophisticated ToM computations.
According to these two hypothesis, active inhibition may not
be required to provide a lenient moral judgment of agent that
caused accidental harm. In those cases, one may argue that the
inhibition of the prepotent cause-based response would operate
indirectly via the selective activation of the relevant content (i.e,
the agent’s mental state) and not the suppression of the irrele-
vant one (i.e., the agent’s causal role). This kind of Bpassive
inhibition^ (Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012) would
predict inhibitory control to predict ToM computations only but
not lenient moral judgment about accidental harm.
In sum, future work may need to take into consideration
how and when inhibitory control resources operate on the
generation of moral judgment by systematically controlling
for all the abilities and operations in moral judgment that
may involve inhibitory control resources.
Towards an ecologically valid ETIC model of morality
A recurring issue in the field of moral cognition is that of
ecological validity. When we witness actual intentional, acci-
dental or attempted harm, we are likely to have a negative
emotional response, to deploy our ToM competencies and/or
inhibitory control to understand the situation perceived and
evaluate the agents involved. However, we may wonder
whether those process are engaged similarly in real life events
and in extremely controlled but features-limited stimuli used
in experimental settings (Pan & Slater, 2011; Patil, Cogoni,
Zangrando, Chittaro, & Silani, 2014). For instance, Pan and
Slater (2011) investigated whether adults’ moral judgment in
Trolley-like dilemmas were similar in classical experimental
settings and virtual reality settings. Preliminary results showed
that although participants in virtual reality settings presented
similar responses to moral dilemmas as they did in a previous
online survey, participants that were placed in an immersive
virtual environment were more likely to commit mistakes
(e.g., impulsively pressing a wrong button) than those that
did the experiment in a desktop with virtual reality.
However, those who were placed in immersive virtual reality
also presented a higher proportion of utilitarian judgments in a
questionnaire with similar dilemmas that followed the virtual
reality conditions. While the reasons for this differential pat-
tern of response remain to be investigated, these findings
might suggest that individuals experience stronger emotional
responses when making decisions in more real-life environ-
ments, thus causing them to act more impulsively and make
more ‘mistakes,’ whilst at the same time influencing them to
generate more ‘rational’ responses afterwards. Applied to the
integration of information about intention, we may wonder
whether individuals would be more or less sensitive to infor-
mation about intentions in their everyday decisionmaking. On
the one hand, it is possible that in real life conditions, people
are more likely to be aroused by the harm caused, making
them less likely to integrate information about intentions in
their appraisal of the situation. On the other hand, it is possible
that people may generate more intent-based judgments when
facing situations similar to ones experienced before. Indeed,
we have to acknowledge that the ETIC model and the current
review are based on the extant empirical literature, which is
largely restricted to very controlled experimental protocols. It
remains to be seen how well the model can serve in account-
ing for every day, naturalistic moral judgments.
Importantly, in real life, determining the intentional structure
of a given action is likely to rely on manymore features that the
the strictly controlled ones we have focused on. In this article,
we mostly focused on whether individuals successfully rely on
high order ToM reasoning to infer others’ complex mental
states (such as desires, believes, and false believes) and gener-
ate intent-based moral judgment. However, in real life, features
such as the goal-directedness of the action performed, its con-
trollability (Weiner, 1995), or the agents’s emotional states
(e.g., whether she/he is surprised or happy about the results of
her/his action; Behne, Carpenter and Tomasello, 2005) may be
critical in determining saliency and helping individuals to de-
termine whether someone acts intentionally or not. Since most
of the critical features that feed into these decisions are proc-
essed using lower-level mechanism that are available early dur-
ing the development (Brandone & Wellman, 2009; Cannon &
Woodward 2012), it is possible that information about agents’
intentions are incorporated much more easily in daily-life set-
tings than in the experimental settings.
Although evaluating the intentions of an agent may be
sufficient for exculpating the agent of an accidental harm in
experimental settings or in daily-life interactions, recent de-
velopmental studies have also highlighted the relevance of
information about negligence in individuals’ tendency to
blame an agent for his accidental harm (Nobes et al., 2009).
The ability to process carelessness is probably highly depen-
dent on the integrity of ToM capacities, since it requires the
integration of information about the agent’s knowledge and
contextual information, as well as information about the
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agent’s intentions (Nuñez, Laurent & Gray, 2014). However,
attributing carelessness may also depend on individuals’ per-
sonality and thus does not exclusively depend on the integrity
of ToM capacities. Studies that have explored the processes
underlying typical and clinical populations’ sensitivity to in-
formation about negligence in morality are still rare but would
be be essential to refine the structure of the ETIC model and
our understanding of the ability to generate intent-based moral
judgments.
From moral judgment abilities to moral behavior
Another challenge for future research is to systematically in-
vestigate the associations between different sub-components
of the ETIC model (i.e., emotional arousal, ToM, and inhibi-
tory control), moral judgment abilities and moral behavior. It
is unlikely that different types of moral judgment impairments
(resulting from atypical emotional arousal, ToM, or inhibitory
control processes) all impact similarly on moral behavior.
We can illustrate this with the dissociation between the
processes implicated in causal and intentional evaluations
and how distinct pattern of compromised processing might
result in specific vulnerabilities to proactive and reactive ag-
gression separately. Notably, atypical processing of the nega-
tive outcomes following a harmful action (i.e., positive out-
come expectancies: expecting less negative outcomes follow-
ing an aggressive act) is associated with higher levels of pro-
active aggression in individuals (Crick & Dodge, 1996). By
contrast, atypical processing of innocent intentions (i.e.,
misjudging any provocations as guided by malevolent inten-
tions) has been associated with higher levels of reactive
aggression (Crick & Dodge, 1996). The positive outcome
expectancies could be (at least partially) related to a dimin-
ished response to others’ suffering while the atypical process-
ing of other’s intentions as malevolent may be related to ToM
and/or inhibitory control deficits. Individuals with antisocial
behavior disorders are a heterogeneous group: whereas some
of these individuals – comparable to individuals with psy-
chopathy presented above – are characterized by diminished
response to others’ suffering and positive outcome expectan-
cies following aggression (Blair, 2013; Jones, Happé, Gilbert,
Burnett, & Viding, 2010; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003),
others display a high baseline emotional reactivity to salient/
provocative stimuli and to the distress of others (Hodsoll,
Lavie, & Viding 2014; Kimonis, Frick, Munoz, & Aucoin,
2008; Loney, Frick, Clements, Ellis, & Kerlin, 2010), a ten-
dency to attribute malevolent intention in situations that
others’ view more neutrally (Frick & Morris, 2004; Pardini
et al., 2003), and poor inhibitory control skills at least in tasks
that require control of affective responses (Blair, 2013). No
study, to the best of our knowledge has yet systematically
explored how the processing atypicalities seen in different
types of individuals with antisocial disorders may relate to
selective moral judgment impairments. It would be of interest
to test whether, for example, evaluating the outcome of ag-
gression positively is linked to a lack of sensitivity to the
agent’s causal role or whether the tendency to attribute malev-
olent intent is related to a diminished integration of the agent’s
innocent intention into moral judgment. The ETIC model
could, therefore, be applied to systematically extend the cur-
rent evidence base on antisocial behavior disorders and pro-
vide a way of interrogating the relationship between moral
judgment and moral behavior.
Conclusion
Findings in the fields of cognitive psychology and cogni-
tive neuroscience support the notion that moral judgments
are contingent on complex and multiple cognitive pro-
cesses such as emotional arousal, ToM, and inhibitory
control. With the ETIC model we attempt to outline the
processes (and interactions between the processes) that
may underlie our ability to generate moral judgments of
basic harmful actions. We reviewed recent findings from
cognitive experimental, neuroscience, developmental, and
clinical studies, and found important support in favor of
the main assumptions of the ETIC model in adults and
developmental and clinical populations.
Nevertheless, a number of points of the model remain to be
addressed and further work needs to be done in order to extend
the evaluation of the ETIC model to real life contexts, as well
as to understand the precise nature and role of emotional pro-
cesses, ToM, and inhibitory control resources in our moral
judgment abilities.
In order to achieve this understanding, we propose that
future studies should systematically assess different types of
moral judgments in relation to the target mechanisms that are
proposed to contribute to moral cognition. This could be done
in several ways, for example by using electrophysiological
measures to index emotional arousal, by employing more sen-
sitive and controlled tasks than the False Belief Task for quan-
tifying ToM capacities, and by including comprehensive mea-
sures of inhibitory control resources. Ideally, these measures
should be used together to control for the potential overlap that
may exist between these cognitive mechanisms. Ultimately,
such studies would have the potential to help us to demon-
strate the interactive nature of the different evaluative systems
that constitute our moral judgment abilities. These types of
experiments should be conducted with adults but also with
typically developing children and children with different de-
velopmental disorders, using longitudinal designs. This
should give us a more precise and less speculative picture of
the role of, and the nature of, the interaction between empathic
processes, ToM abilities, and inhibitory control resources re-
quired to develop moral judgment abilities. Additionally,
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when assessing children of different ages and various clinical
groups, measurement of emotional arousal, ToM, and inhibitory
control may help explain heterogeneity in moral judgment
ability across typical development and within a given pathology.
Future work should also study the importance of those
processes for different types of moral judgments separately
(e.g., judgment of wrongness, judgment of punishment).
Since few studies have systematically compared different
types of moral judgments (but see Cushman, 2008;
Cushman et al., 2013), we consider that available evidence
is presently too scarce to conduct a proper evaluation of the
differential involvement of emotional arousal, ToM, and in-
hibitory control in these different types of moral judgments.
Subsequent empirical studies should employ paradigms
that enable researchers to directly contrast predictions made
by the ETIC model and Cushman’s model, particularly in
relation to developmental samples. The ETIC model proposes
that the abilitity to generate intent-based moral judgments
mainly relies on the maturation of ToM capacities and inhib-
itory control resources wheras Cushman’s model posits that
the ability to generate intent-based moral judgments largely
relies on children’s conceptual development (Cushman et al.,
2013). A systematic empirical investigation of the predictions
from these two models will arbitrate whether development of
moral competencies exclusively relies on the functional inte-
gration of multiple cognitive systems and/or the acquisition of
specific conceptual knowledge.
Finally, there is a dearth of studies investigating the links
between moral judgments abilities and moral behavior. Such
studies should come with a full assessment of antisocial
behavior disorder symptoms that would include both the
severity as well as the type of behavioral problems displayed
by participants. This would be essential to understand the
links between Bbasic^ cognitive components, moral judgment
abilities, and moral behavior as well as the different paths that
lead individuals to behave in a morally inappropriate way.
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